U.S. District Judge E. Richard Webber ruling discounts Fourteenth Amendment violation or discriminatory claims, on a case brought before him regarding an Illegal Alien Ordinance enacted in his state with a constitutional violation claim.  The highlighting on pages 44, 45 & 46 shown below is mine - the full ruling is available on line by googling it.

c. Merits

As the Court has found that Plaintiffs lack standing, and alternately that the claimed

discriminatory action lacks state action, it is unnecessary to address the merits of Plaintiffs’ equal

protection claim. However, to ensure that all issues are fully addressed, the Court will briefly

touch on the merits of Plaintiffs’ claim. This requires a brief discussion of both Plaintiffs’ facial

challenge asserting that the Ordinance has a discriminatory impact, and Plaintiffs’ assertion that

the Ordinance was passed with a discriminatory intent. The first question to be determined is

what classification is being challenged, upon making such a determination, the Court then applies

the appropriate test to determine whether the challenged conduct violates the Equal Protection

Clause.

Plaintiffs characterize the Ordinance at issue as one which classifies individuals on the

basis of national origin, which would require analysis under the strict scrutiny test. Conversely,

Defendant argues that the Ordinance classifies individuals on the basis of immigration status, and

thus requires application of the rational basis test. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223 ("Undocumented

aliens cannot be treated as a suspect class because their presence in this country in violation of

federal law is not a ‘constitutional irrelevancy.’"). The Ordinance in question classifies workers

on the basis of immigration status, that is whether they are legally permitted to work in the United

States. Such a classification does not require strict scrutiny by this Court, but rather the City need

only show that there is a rational basis between the Ordinance and the purpose for which it was

passed. Id. The City specifically states in the second section of the Ordinance that "illegal

immigration leads to higher crime rates, subjects our hospitals to fiscal hardship and our residents

to substandard quality of care, contributes to other burdens on public services, increasing their

costs and diminishing their availability, diminishes our overall quality of life, and endangers the

security and safety of the homeland." Ordinance No. 1722, § 1C. The Court recognizes that such

a finding of purpose would fall into a different analysis under strict scrutiny, required in the

context of a suspect classification, however, the rational basis standard requires far less analysis.

Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224; see also Pennell v. City of San Hose, 485 U.S. 1, (1988) ("[W]e will not

overturn a statute that does not burden a suspect class or a fundamental interest unless the varying

treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of

legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature’s actions were irrational."

(internal quotation omitted)). The Court in Plyler, also stated that "the States do have some

authority to act with respect to illegal aliens, at least where such action mirrors federal objectives

and furthers a legitimate state goal." Id. at 225. On its face, Ordinance No. 1722 does not violate

the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The majority of the evidence submitted by Plaintiffs is in support of their claim that the

Ordinance in question was intended to discriminate against Hispanics. In support of this

assertion, Plaintiffs point to evidence of comments made by the Mayor, and subsequently reported

in a local newspaper article, as well as materials circulated to the Board of Alderman prior to the

passage of the Ordinance at issue. Defendant disputes that this information is sufficient to support

a finding of discriminatory intent.

The Supreme Court in Rogers v. Lodge, held that a legislative scheme that is not on its

face unconstitutional, may violate the Fourteenth Amendment "if ‘conceived or operated as

purposeful devices to further racial discrimination’ . . .." 458 U.S. 613, 617 (1982) (quoting

Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971). The Supreme Court in Whitcomb stated that

"the courts have been vigilant in scrutinizing schemes allegedly conceived or operated as

purposeful devices to further racial discrimination." 403 U.S. at 149. The Court notes that there

PAGE 46

can be no claim that the Ordinance operates to discriminate, as it has yet to be enforced, but the

Court will review the claim that it was conceived as a "purposeful device[] to further racial

discrimination." Id. A court addressing the question of the validity of an Ordinance, "must keep

in mind the fundamental principal that ‘official action will not be held unconstitutional solely

because it results in a racially disproportionate impact . . .. Proof of racially discriminatory intent

or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.’" Hernandez v. New

York, 500 U.S. 352, 359-360 (1991) (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing

Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-265 (1977)). "Discriminatory purpose implies more than

intent as volition or intent as awareness or consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker

selected a particular course of action it least in part because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse

effects upon an identifiable group." Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360 (internal alterations and citations

omitted).

The Court must decide whether Plaintiffs have presented evidence, sufficient to show a

genuine issue of material fact. The Court finds that Plaintiffs fail to meet this standard. As an

initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiffs must show discriminatory intent by the Alderman, and

not only by the Mayor. Even assuming that the City was aware that the Ordinance would

disproportionately effect Hispanic applicants, and assuming that such a negative impact results,31

there is no evidence that the Ordinance was passed because of this negative impact. The

testimony of each of the Board of Aldermen belies this assertion. Each one testified to their

reasons for passing the Ordinance, and each reason related to the impact of illegal workers on the

job market, the strain on the local economy because of illegal immigrants, and the impact on other